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THE $1 MILLION MESSAGE: LAWYERS RISK
FEES AND MORE WHEN REPRESENTING OUT-
OF-STATE CLIENTS
John J. D'Attomo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Have you ever represented an out-of-state client? Per-
haps the matter involved litigation in another state. Or
maybe you negotiated an employment contract for the client
under the laws of the foreign state. Still further, you may
have drafted a will for a client living in a neighboring state.
Were you licensed to practice law in the foreign jurisdiction?
If not, the recent California Supreme Court decision in Bir-
brower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court
(Birbrower)l serves as a compelling reminder of the legal and
ethical issues lawyers face when representing out-of-state
clients.
In Birbrower,2 the California Supreme Court held that a
New York law firm engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law in California by giving legal advice and otherwise as-
sisting their California client in resolving a contract dispute
in California.3 This ruling barred the firm's recovery of more
than $1 million in fees.4
As Birbrower demonstrates, the unauthorized practice of
law may result in serious adverse consequences for a practi-
tioner. For one, the unauthorized practice of law violates
* B.S. Loyola University Chicago, magna cum laude, 1990; J.D. The John
Marshall Law School, cum laude, 1993. John J. D'Attomo practices commercial
litigation with Gardner, Carton & Douglas in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. D'Attomo is
admitted to practice in Illinois and Arizona.
1. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id. at 10, 13.
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state law regulating the practice of law. These statutory
violations are punishable as criminal offenses' or as contempt
of court.6 The unauthorized practice of law also violates the
rules of professional conduct.7 Thus, a lawyer may also face
disciplinary sanctions.8 Finally, as in Birbrower, a finding of
unauthorized practice may preclude recovery of the lawyer's
fee.'
Birbrower is the most comprehensive decision from a
state's highest court addressing the unauthorized practice of
law by out-of-state lawyers. Despite the attention Birbrower
has generated, 9 the court's holding is unremarkable. The
"practice of law" definition adopted in Birbrower is not
unique, and the factual record convincingly supports the
court's decision. Additionally, barring recovery of fees gener-
ated by the unauthorized practice of law is an established
sanction."
5. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (1998) (misdemeanor offense).
For a complete list of those jurisdictions imposing misdemeanor criminal penal-
ties, see Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitu-
tional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 11 n.39 (1981).
6. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1 (1995) (stating that a person prac-
ticing law in Illinois without a license "is guilty of contempt of court and shall
be punished accordingly").
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1983). See also
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 118 (4th ed. 1995).
8. John F. Sutton, Jr., Unauthorized Practice of Law by Lawyers: A Post-
Seminar Reflection on "Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law," 36
S. TEX. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (1995) (noting that the rules of professional conduct
authorize professional discipline in addition to state law penalties).
9. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 10 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998) ("It is a general rule that an
attorney is barred from recovering compensation for services rendered in an-
other state where the attorney was not admitted to the bar.") (citation omitted);
see also Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1986); Lozoff v. Shore
Heights, Ltd., 362 N.E.2d 1047 (Ill. 1977); Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329
(N.Y. 1965); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 259 (1997); Annot., Right of At-
torney Admitted in One State to Recover Compensation for Services Rendered in
Another State Where He Was Not Admitted to the Bar, 11 A.L.R. 3d 907, 908
(1967). This rule is codified in many states. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
205/1 (1995) ("No person shall receive any compensation directly or indirectly
for any legal services other than a regularly licensed attorney.").
10. See, e.g., Debra Baker, Lawyer, Go Home, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 22;
George W. Overton, California Leads The Way-But Wither?, 12 C.B.A. Rec.,
Apr. 1998, at 62; Arthur S. Hayes, No Trespassing-License Required, Nat'l L.
J., Jan. 19, 1998, at A4; ALAS Loss Prevention Journal, Jan. 1998, at 25.
11. See Sutton, supra note 8, at 1033.
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While the Birbrower holding breaks no new ground, the
court's dicta is significant. In dicta, the court indicates that
an out-of-state practitioner may violate a state's unauthor-
ized practice rules even where the practitioner never physi-
cally enters the foreign state.1" This notion represents a de-
parture from traditional unauthorized practice concepts and
raises significant concerns for lawyers serving out-of-state
clients. 1"
This article analyzes Birbrower and its interpretation of
California's unauthorized practice statute. 4 This article also
examines the exceptions traditionally available to out-of-state
practitioners and concludes that these exceptions afford only
limited protection from unauthorized practice claims. 5 Fi-
nally, this article discusses Birbrower's impact on non-
California lawyers and suggests measures an out-of-state
lawyer may implement to guard against an unauthorized
practice claim. 6
II. NON-CALIFORNIA LAWYERS AND THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
A. The Birbrower Opinion.
In 1992, ESQ Business Services, Inc. (ESQ), a California
corporation, engaged the New York law firm Birbrower, Mon-
talbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. (Birbrower) to investigate and
prosecute a claim against Tandem Computers Incorporated
(Tandem) arising from a software development contract be-
tween ESQ and Tandem. 7 The ESQ-Tandem contract pro-
vided that California law would govern the contract and that
all disputes would be resolved by arbitration in accordance
with American Arbitration Association rules. 8
In the course of representing ESQ, Birbrower performed
some legal services from its New York office. 9 In addition,
12. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5-6.
13. See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 3 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
18. Id. at 3, 14.
19. Id. at 10-11.
449
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Birbrower lawyers traveled to California and engaged in ac-
tivities on behalf of ESQ in California on several occasions.' °
Specifically, in 1992, Birbrower lawyers met with ESQ and
its accountants in California to discuss a strategy for resolv-
ing the dispute.2' The Birbrower lawyers "made recommenda-
tions and gave advice."22 Birbrower lawyers also met with
representatives from Tandem on behalf of ESQ.23 At this
meeting, one Birbrower lawyer gave his opinion that dam-
ages would exceed $15 million if the case proceeded to litiga-
tion.24 Another Birbrower lawyer made a settlement demand
on ESQ's behalf.25 Also in California, Birbrower filed an arbi-
tration demand on ESQ's behalf with the American Arbitra-
tion Association.26
The Birbrower lawyers again traveled to California in
1993.27 The lawyers interviewed potential arbitrators and
again met with ESQ and its accountants.28 Later that year,
Birbrower lawyers returned to California to assist in settling
the dispute with Tandem. 29  During this trip, a Birbrower
lawyer discussed a proposed settlement with ESQ and its ac-
countants. ° Birbrower gave ESQ legal advice during this
visit, including a recommendation to reject the proposed set-
tlement.31 ESQ and Tandem thereafter settled their dispute,
and the matter never proceeded to arbitration.32 No Bir-
brower lawyer was licensed to practice law in California
during the course of the representation.3
In 1994, ESQ sued Birbrower for legal malpractice.34
Birbrower counterclaimed to recover its fees for both its Cali-
20. Id. at 3, 7.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 3, 7 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
24. Id. at 3, 7.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1,3 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 4.
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fornia and New York services. ESQ responded that Bir-
brower's representation of ESQ constituted the unauthorized
practice of law in California and precluded Birbrower from
recovering fees for these services." The California Supreme
Court agreed, concluding that Birbrower's activities in Cali-
fornia on behalf of ESQ constituted the unauthorized practice
of law in violation of California law.36
B. Did the Birbrower Lawyers "Practice Law"?
The Birbrower court held that the Birbrower lawyers
violated section 6125 of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code.37 Section 6125 provides: "[n]o person shall prac-
tice law in California unless the person is an active member
of the State Bar."8 Although section 6125 clearly proscribes
the unauthorized practice of law, the statute does not define
the term "practice law." Thus, deciding the ultimate issue of
whether the Birbrower lawyers violated section 6125 first re-
quires a determination of whether Birbrower's services con-
stituted the practice of law.39
Relying on California precedent, the Birbrower majority
defined the practice of law as "the doing and performing
services in a court of justice," as well as "legal advice" and
"legal instrument and contract preparation."4" The underly-
ing dispute between ESQ and Tandem in Birbrower was set-
tled without litigation.4 The Birbrower lawyers, therefore,
did not "[perform] services in a court of justice. 42 However,
the Birbrower lawyers did render legal advice in California.43
35. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 4 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
36. Id. at 13.
37. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (1998).
38. Id.
39. The "practice of law" defies clear or consistent definition. See Anno-
tated MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 ("[T]here is no single
definition of the practice of law in the United States; the definition varies from
one jurisdiction to another."); ROTUNDA, supra note 7, at 118 ("The state law
definitions of unauthorized practice are varied and often confused.") (citation
omitted).
40. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 3 ("[Birbrower] made recommendations and gave advice ....
[Birbrower] gave ESQ advice during this trip ....").
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The Birbrower lawyers arguably engaged in "legal instru-
ment and contract preparation" in California by virtue of
their participation in the drafting of the ESQ-Tandem set-
tlement agreement between ESQ and Tandem and preparing
ESQ's arbitration demand." Based on these findings, the
court concluded that Birbrower's services constituted the
practice of law.45
The dissenting justice in Birbrower criticized the major-
ity's "practice law" definition as "overbroad."" The dissent
proposed a more narrow definition, contending that the prac-
tice of law means the representation of another in litigation,
or performing "an activity requiring the application of that
degree of legal knowledge and technique possessed only by a
trained legal mind."47 Thus, excluding litigation, only com-
plex legal services necessitating a "trained legal mind" would
constitute the practice of law. According to the dissent, the
Birbrower lawyers simply assisted in resolving the contract
dispute between ESQ and Tandem through negotiation
and/or arbitration.48 In the dissent's view, these services did
not require application of "that degree of legal knowledge and
technique possessed only by a trained legal mind." 9
The dissent's "trained legal mind" standard complicates
the "practice law" analysis. Application of the dissent's stan-
dard would require courts to distinguish between legal serv-
ices requiring a degree of legal knowledge and technique
"possessed only by a trained legal mind," and those legal
services requiring some degree of "legal knowledge and tech-
nique," but not that degree of knowledge and technique pos-
sessed only by a trained legal mind. A definition requiring
such amorphous distinctions would create additional ambi-
guities and yield unpredictable results. By contrast, the ma-
jority's definition is well grounded in established case law5 6
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 13.
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 13-14.
49. Id. at 17 ("[R]epresentation of another in an arbitration proceeding, in-
cluding the activities necessary to prepare for the arbitration hearing, does not
necessarily require a trained legal mind.").
50. The majority adopted its definition from a 56-year-old California Su-
preme Court opinion. See People ex rel. Lawyers' Institute of San Diego v.
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and is utilized by courts throughout the country.5' Perhaps
more significantly, the majority's definition offers a more
concrete standard for assessing whether a particular legal
service constitutes the practice of law. This practice of law
definition adopted in Birbrower includes "the doing and per-
forming in a court of justice in any matter depending therein
throughout its various stages and in conformity with the
adopted rules of procedure" as well as "legal advice and legal
instrument and contract preparation, whether or not these
subjects were rendered in the course of litigation."
A close analysis reveals that any disagreement between
the majority and dissent as to the appropriate "practice law"
definition is immaterial because the majority's conclusion
that Birbrower practiced law is sound under either defini-
tion.52 Indeed, when properly viewed in light of the trial
court's findings, the Birbrower lawyers practiced law even
under the dissent's more narrow "practice law" definition."8
The dissent's summary characterization 4 of Birbrower's
services ignores the trial court's extensive factual findings,
which convincingly show that Birbrower engaged in numer-
ous activities requiring a trained legal mind." These activi-
ties included analyzing California law, applying that law to
the dispute between ESQ and Tandem, formulating a dam-
age estimate based on an analysis of the applicable law, and
evaluating the adequacy of the proposed settlement in light
of the applicable law. 6 Although the Birbrower lawyers ul-
Merchants' Protective Corp., 209 P. 363 (Cal. 1922). The Merchants court
adopted its definition verbatim from an Indiana Supreme Court decision dating
back to 1893. See Eley v. Miller, 34 N.E. 836, 837-38 (Ind. App. Ct. 1893).
51. Other courts have articulated a substantially identical definition. See,
e.g., Akron Bar Ass'n v. Miller, 684 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Ohio 1997); Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1267-68
(Utah 1997); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 87 N.E.2d 773,
776 (Ill. 1949).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 47.
53. Applying its definition, the dissent concluded that an issue of fact ex-
isted as to whether Birbrower engaged in the practice of law thus precluding
summary judgment in favor of ESQ. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank,
P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 16 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
54. In contrast to the majority's extensive recitation of Birbrower's activi-
ties, see id. at 3, the dissent's description of these services consists of a mere
two sentences. Id. at 14.
55. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 3, 7.
56. Id.
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timately performed a dispute resolution function, they neces-
sarily utilized the legal knowledge and technique of a trained
legal mind to competently perform this service. The dissent's
contrary conclusion fails to appreciate the legal analysis and
skilled judgment necessary to effectively perform even rou-
tine legal services. Following the majority's definition, there-
fore, Birbrower practiced law because they gave legal advice
and drafted legal instruments. However, even under the dis-
sent's definition, Birbrower practiced law by engaging in nu-
merous activities that require a trained legal mind.
C. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Must Occur "in
California"
The unauthorized practice of law prohibited by section
6125 must occur "in California."57 Without question, section
6125 prohibits the unauthorized practice of law within the
geographic confines of the State of California. Birbrower's
significance derives from its suggestion that an out-of-state
lawyer may practice law "in California" without physically
entering the State of California.58 Although controversial,
this extension of section 6125 is justifiable in view of the
statute's avowed purpose.
Section 6125 seeks to protect California citizens from the
practice of law by persons not trained or examined on Cali-
fornia law."0 A lawyer not licensed to practice California law
could enter the State of California and thereby subject Cali-
fornia citizens to the risks of unauthorized practice. Fur-
thermore, an out-of-state lawyer could represent a California
citizen and thereby subject a California citizen to the risks of
unauthorized practice, without entering the State of Califor-
nia. To address this latter circumstance, Birbrower's "in
California" test requires an assessment of the out-of-state
lawyer's contacts with the California client, irrespective of
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 5-6. ("For example, one may practice law in the state in violation
of section 6125 although not physically present here by advising a California
client on California law in connection with a California legal dispute by tele-
phone, fax, computer, or other modern technological means.").
59. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
60. See id. at 5, 8. See also Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 927 (noting that
section 6125 seeks to "protect California citizens from incompetent attorneys").
454 [Vol. 39
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the geographic location of the lawyer or client.6" The court
announced, "[i]n our view, the practice of law 'in California'
entails sufficient contact with the California client to render
the nature of the legal services a clear legal representation."62
The Birbrower lawyers engaged in extensive activities
constituting the practice of law without a California license
while physically present in the State of California over a two-
year period.6" On these facts, the Court had little difficulty
concluding that Birbrower practiced law "in California"-they
practiced law while physically present in the state.64 How-
ever, the Birbrower lawyers may have violated section 6125
even absent their physical presence in California. Birbrower
indicates that an out-of-state practitioner who never physi-
cally enters the State of California may maintain sufficient
contacts with a California client so as to practice law "in Cali-
fornia."5
First, an out-of-state practitioner could maintain
"sufficient contact" with a California client through "virtual"
contacts with the California client.66 "For example, one may
practice law in the state in violation of section 6125 without
being physically present here by advising a California client
on California law in connection with a California legal dis-
pute by telephone, fax, computer, or other modern techno-
logical means."" While declining to specify what amount of
virtual contacts the court would deem "sufficient contact," the
court did reject the possibility that a single virtual contact
with a California client would automatically constitute suffi-
cient contact.68
In addition to virtual contacts with a California client, a
lawyer could also maintain "sufficient contact" with a Cali-
61. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5-6.
62. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
63. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 3, 7.
64. Id.
65. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.) ("Our definition does not necessarily depend on or require the
unlicensed lawyer's physical presence in the state."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291
(1998).
66. See id. at 5-6.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 6 ("[W]e do reject the notion that a person automatically practices
law 'in California' whenever that person practices California law anywhere, or
'virtually' enters the state by telephone, fax, e-mail, or satellite.").
455
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fornia client without physically entering California by regu-
larly advising a California client on California law outside
the state.69 For example, an Illinois lawyer who regularly ad-
vises a California client on California law during the client's
monthly visit to Illinois is practicing law "in California"
within the meaning of section 6125. In this scenario, the Illi-
nois lawyer has "created a continuing relationship with a
California client."
On the other hand, section 6125 does not prohibit an out-
of-state lawyer from practicing California law for a non-
California client outside the state.0 For example, an Arizona
lawyer could advise an Arizona client on California law out-
side the State of California without offending section 6125."'
Although the Arizona lawyer is practicing California law, the
lawyer is not practicing law "in California" within the mean-
ing of section 6125. That is, rendering legal advice to an Ari-
zona client on California law does not implicate the concerns
underlying section 6125-the protection of California citi-
72
zens.
69. See id. at 5 ("The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer en-
gaged in sufficient activities in the state, or created a continuing relationship
with the California client that included legal duties and obligations.")
(emphasis added).
70. Indeed, the client's state of residence is a critical factor in assessing
whether the lawyer has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See Con-
don v. McHenry, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 922, 928 (1998).
71. See Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924 n.2. In fact, Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr.
2d. at n.2, indicates that the court even permitted the Colorado lawyer to re-
cover fees for some work performed while physically present within the State of
California. Id. Thus, Condon suggests that a non-California lawyer could prac-
tice California law for a non-California client, to some degree, whether physi-
cally present in the State or outside the State.
72. Unauthorized practice rules are enforced less strictly where the out-of-
state lawyer is representing an out-of-state client. In Condon, the California
Court of Appeals held that a Colorado lawyer could recover his fees for legal
services rendered to a Colorado resident who was serving as an executor for a
California estate. Condon v. McHenry, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (1998). As Condon
demonstrates, California would be less vigilant in enforcing its unauthorized
practice rules where an out-of-state lawyer enters California on an isolated oc-
casion to represent a non-California client. Id. Although the out-of-state law-
yer is practicing law "in California" by virtue of his physical presence in the
State of California, the State's interest in policing this conduct is lessened be-
cause a California citizen is not at risk. See Illinois Bar Journal Advisory
Opinion No. 94-5 (1995) ("For example, a New York lawyer may be retained by
a New York client to negotiate a transaction with an Illinois party in Illinois.
Given that the purpose of the Illinois statute prohibiting the practice of law by
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Both the virtual contact test and the continuing relation-
ship test73 permit a finding of unauthorized practice absent a
physical presence in California. This interpretation of the "in
California" element is consistent with section 6125's purpose
of protecting California citizens from the risks of unauthor-
ized practice.74 This interpretation also represents an effort
to adapt California's unauthorized practice rules to the mod-
ern practice of law in which technology permits lawyers to
communicate with clients, and maintain a relationship with
clients, without entering the foreign state and without per-
sonal client contact. Although unprecedented,75 Birbrower's
extension of the rules governing unauthorized practice fur-
71thers the statute's avowed purpose.
D. Is Birbrower Internally Inconsistent?
The Birbrower holding barred recovery of those fees at-
tributable to Birbrower's illegal practice-Birbrower's prac-
tice of law in California.77 However, the court remanded the
case to allow Birbrower to pursue recovery of those fees at-
tributable to its services rendered exclusively from its New
York office.7 ' The court identified these New York services as
unlicensed persons is to protect the public (presumably the people of Illinois)
from representation by untrained and unexamined people, the Committee does
not believe it necessary for Illinois to protect a New York client in a multi-state
transaction from representation by a New York lawyer."); see also Fought &
Company, Inc. v. Steel Eng'g and Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487, 498 (Haw. 1998)
(explaining that an attorney who served as general counsel for an Oregon cor-
poration did not practice law "within the jurisdiction" of Hawaii where the Ore-
gon corporation was involved in litigation in Hawaii and the attorney per-
formed substantial services constituting the practice of law; the court
emphasized that the attorney "did not represent a Hawai'i client").
73. These tests bears a striking similarity to the "purposeful availment"
analysis used to determine whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction com-
ports with due process. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-
76 (1985) ("[W]here the defendant 'deliberately' has engaged in significant ac-
tivities within a State ... or has created 'continuing obligations' between him-
self and residents of the forum ... he manifestly has availed himself of the
privilege of conducting business there... [j]urisdiction in these circumstances
may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the
forum State.") (citations omitted).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
75. See Baker, Lawyer, Go Home, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 22.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
77. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court 949
P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
78. The Court determined that the illegal portion of the fee contract (the
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"fee contract negotiations and corporate case research."79
Permitting Birbrower to seek recovery of fees generated
from its New York office is inconsistent with the court's
"virtual contact" and "continuing relationship" concepts.
Even those services Birbrower performed from its New York
office would involve virtual contacts with a California client
(ESQ), presumably by telephone, fax, and e-mail.8" The fee
contract negotiations in New York likely included transmit-
ting drafts of the proposed fee agreement to ESQ in Califor-
nia by facsimile. At the very least, rendering these "New
York services" required telephone calls to ESQ in California.
These telephone calls and facsimile transmissions would
satisfy the virtual contacts test.8' Alternatively, assuming
insufficient virtual contacts, Birbrower nonetheless rendered
these New York services in the course of "a continuing rela-
tionship with [a] California client." In either case, the "in
California" element of section 6125 would be satisfied.82
Thus, allowing Birbrower to recover its New York fees con-
flicts with the Court's dicta interpreting the "in California"
element to include "virtual contacts" with a California client
or the maintenance of a "continuing relationship" with a Cali-
fornia client. Applying the court's "virtual contacts" and
"continuing relationship" tests, Birbrower should also be pre-
cluded from recovering its New York fees.
III. ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS?
Birbrower outlines several exceptions to section 6125.
The two principal exceptions are 1) the so-called "federal
California services) could be severed from the remainder of the fee contract.
Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 13. Birbrower also sought to recover its California fees
under a quantum meruit theory. That claim was not adjudicated at the trial
court level and thus the quantum meruit claim for Birbrower's California fees
remained a viable theory on remand, along with Birbrower's claim for its New
York fees under a contract theory. See id. at 10 n.5. Some courts conclude that
a finding of unauthorized practice will preclude recovery of fees under both
theories. See, e.g., Servidone Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
911 F. Supp. 560, 576 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); Martin v. Martin, 541 So.2d 1, 1 (Ala.
1989); Taft v. Amsel, 180 A.2d 756, 757 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962).
79. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 11.
80. See id. at 5-6.
81. See id.
82. See id. (finding that even absent physical presence, an out-of-state law-
yer may violate section 6125 through virtual contacts with the California client
or by creating a continuing relationship with a California client).
[Vol. 39
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court" exception, and 2) admission pro hac vice, neither of
which applied in Birbrower" Although these are viable ex-
ceptions, Birbrower illustrates that they afford only limited
protection from unauthorized practice claims.
A. The Federal Court Exception Is Really the Federal Claim
Exception
As a general rule, a lawyer may practice in a federal
court of a foreign state even though the lawyer is not licensed
to practice in that state." This rule is based on principles of
federal preemption." That is, each federal court prescribes
its own rules governing the admission of attorneys to practice
before that court." To the extent a federal rule permitting
the lawyer's appearance conflicts with a state rule prohibit-
ing the lawyer's appearance, the supremacy clause preempts
the contrary state rule.
While recognizing the validity of the federal court excep-
tion, the Birbrower court found the exception inapplicable,
stating that "none of Birbrower's activities related to federal
court practice."8 As discussed below, even if the dispute be-
tween ESQ and Tandem involved federal court proceedings,
83. Another exception exists for foreign legal consultants who obtain a reg-
istration certificate from the California State Bar. Id. at 6-7. These consult-
ants may advise on the law of the foreign jurisdiction in which they are admit-
ted. Id. Finally, international commercial disputes resolved under California
arbitration rules are also exempt from section 6125. Id.
84. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 166 (2d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
85. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y.
1964), affd in part, rev'd in part, 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 987 (1966).
86. See id. at 13.
87. See id.
88. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 10 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998). In proceedings before the
California Court of Appeal, Birbrower contended that the federal court excep-
tion applied because the ESQ-Tandem contract required arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank,
P.C. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), review
granted, 930 P.2d 399 (1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 949 P.2d 1 (1998). Bir-
brower argued that proceedings before the American Arbitration Association
were analogous to practice before a federal court. Id. The Court of Appeal re-
jected this argument concluding that the supremacy issues underlying the fed-
eral court exception were not applicable where the parties select their own fo-
rum to resolve a dispute. Id.
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the federal court exception would not protect the Birbrower
firm.
The leading case of Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.89
addresses a lawyer's claim for fees based on the federal court
exception. There, a California attorney (Spanos) sued a New
York client seeking to recover his fees.9" The New York client
retained Spanos to assist in the preparation and litigation of
an antitrust suit in federal district court in New York.91
Spanos was not a member of the New York state bar."
The client argued that Spanos was not licensed to prac-
tice in New York and, therefore, New York's unauthorized
practice statute barred recovery of Spanos' fees.93 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.94 Sitting en banc, the
court held that New York law could not prevent an out-of-
state lawyer from recovering fees for work performed on a
federal claim in federal court.99
While permitting Spanos to recover his fees attributable
to the federal antitrust claim, the court noted that a federal
claim could "depend in part on an issue or claim which has
its source in state law."" Recognizing that a federal claim
could involve state law issues, the court additionally required
that out-of-state counsel associate with local counsel in the
foreign state." The court emphasized that its holding was
narrow, stating that whether the federal court exception
would apply "if the client in such case dispensed with the lo-
cal attorney or if the matter were one in which federal juris-
diction rested on diverse citizenship, are questions better left
to another day."98
89. 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
90. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 164.
93. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 987 (1966).
94. Spanos, 364 F.2d at 171.
95. Id.
96. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 171 (2d Cir.) (en banc)
(citation and quotation omitted), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
97. Id. "We thus limit our holding to the situation here presented, where a
citizen has invited a duly licensed out-of-state lawyer to work in association
with a local lawyer on a federal claim or defense." Id.
98. Id.
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Under Spanos, the federal court exception probably
would not apply where federal jurisdiction is based solely on
diversity of citizenship. In most diversity cases, state law
will govern the dispute.99 Spanos counsels that an out-of-
state lawyer could not litigate a diversity suit in federal
court, notwithstanding his or her admission to the federal
bar and the association of local counsel. Spanos limits the
federal court exception to the litigation of federal claims
premised on federal question jurisdiction.1°' Applying
Spanos, the federal court exception would not apply to the
Birbrower firm even if the dispute between ESQ and Tandem
was litigated in federal court because it was a state law
claim, not a federal claim.'
This construction of the federal court exception furthers
the avowed purpose of section 6125,°2 by prohibiting the
practice of law in a foreign state by persons not educated and
examined on that state's laws. Nonetheless, strict applica-
tion of the Spanos rule becomes unworkable. A case may be
brought in federal court premised on federal question juris-
diction with state law claims joined as supplemental
claims. 103 Following Spanos, the out-of-state lawyer could
litigate the federal claim, but not the supplemental state law
claims. Similarly, because "[s]tate law issues are inevitably
and inextricably intertwined with bankruptcy law issues,"104
a lawyer would not be permitted to practice in a bankruptcy
court in another state even if the lawyer was admitted to the
federal bar.'
Notwithstanding these difficulties in practical applica-
tion, Spanos remains the leading case on the federal court
exception. Spanos indicates that the federal court exception
extends only to federal claims premised on federal question
99. Not all diversity cases will involve state law; the law of a foreign coun-
try may govern. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4) (1998).
100. See Spanos, 364 F.2d at 171.
101. See id.
102. See supra text accompanying note 60.
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1998).
104. See In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665, 673 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (citation
omitted).
105. Although this conclusion is an arguable extension of Spanos, at least
one court has allowed an out-of-state lawyer to recover fees for bankruptcy
court proceedings based on the federal court exception. See Cowen v.
Calabrese, 41 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1964).
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jurisdiction and, therefore, confers the out-of-state practitio-
ner with only limited protection from unauthorized practice
claims. At a minimum, Spanos suggests that the contours of
the federal court exception remain undefined.
B. Pro Hac Vice Does Not Mean Carte Blanche
The other principal exception to section 6125 is pro hac
vice admission. Pro hac vice admission permits an out-of-
state lawyer to perform litigation services in a foreign juris-
diction. 10 6 Birbrower recognizes pro hac vice admission as an
exception to section 6125, so long as the out-of-state lawyer
associates with California counsel.0 7 At the same time, Bir-
brower illustrates the limitations of pro hac vice admission.
As an initial matter, pro hac vice admission applies only
to litigation matters."8 The dispute between ESQ and Tan-
dem did not involve litigation."9 Thus, the Birbrower lawyers
could not avail themselves of this exception. Secondly, ad-
mission pro hac vice is a privilege, not a right."0 A court may
deny a motion for admission pro hac vice in its discretion."'
Furthermore, a court may revoke"2 or suspend 3 a lawyer's
pro hac vice privileges. Finally, a court's rules may limit the
number of times an attorney may appear pro hac vice."'
More significantly, an out-of-state lawyer can obtain ad-
106. See Stephen E. Kalish, Pro Hac Vice Admission: A Proposal, 1979 S.
ILL. U. L. J. 367, 374.
107. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 6 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
108. See Ballard Jay Yelton, Analysis of Illinois' Restrictions on the Practice
of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys: Pro Hac Vice Model Rule Proposal, 16 LOY. U.
CHI. L. J. 695, 710-11 (1985).
109. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 3.
110. See Note, Easing Multistate Practice Restrictions-"Good Cause" Based
Limited Admission, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1182, 1200-01 (1975-76).
111. See Erbacci, Cerone, and Moriarty, Ltd. v. United States, 923 F. Supp.
482 (S.D.N.Y.) (denying application for admission pro hac vice with prejudice),
reconsideration denied, 166 F.R.D. 298 (1996).
112. See State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225 (N.J. 1968) (affirming revocation
of lawyer's admission pro hac vice), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
113. See In re Bailey, 273 A.2d 563 (N.J. 1971) (lawyer's privilege of applying
for pro hac vice admission in New Jersey suspended for one year).
114. See, e.g., Brookens v. Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 538
A.2d 1120, 1124 n.11 (D.C. 1988) (citing District of Columbia court rule which
provides that an attorney admitted pro hac vice "shall not appear or participate
in more than five actions or proceedings in any calendar year....").
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mission pro hac vice only after a lawsuit is filed.' Unless
and until an action is commenced, the out-of-state lawyer is
unable to obtain admission pro hac vice."6 Unfortunately, the
out-of-state lawyer may already have engaged in unauthor-
ized practice during this pre-filing period.
The filing of a complaint at a minimum involves the
drafting of a legal document; this constitutes the practice of
law."7 The out-of-state lawyer may also render substantial
services constituting the practice of law still earlier. Even
before a complaint is drafted, the lawyer will likely give pre-
liminary advice concerning the client's rights under the for-
eign law and the client's prospects for success should the
matter proceed to litigation. A strategy for resolving the dis-
pute may also be discussed. The out-of-state lawyer may also
set forth the client's position in correspondence with the op-
posing party and cite supporting legal authority. These pre-
liminary activities could lead to settlement discussions where
the lawyer would make recommendations concerning a pro-
posed settlement. These pre-filing activities may involve
several trips to the foreign jurisdiction and may occur over a
period of weeks, months, or, as in Birbrower, a period of
years. All of these services constitute the practice of law and
all of these services will have been performed by the out-of-
state lawyer before any opportunity to seek admission pro
hac vice.
Perhaps a court will deem the lawyer's subsequent ad-
mission pro hac vice retroactive and thereby validate the
lawyer's prior activities. But what if the matter is resolved
prior to litigation? That is, what if a lawsuit is never filed?
In those circumstances, the out-of-state lawyer could never
obtain pro hac vice admission. Birbrower illustrates this
predicament, albeit in an arbitration setting. The Birbrower
lawyers never engaged in formal arbitration proceedings." 8
In fact, the Birbrower lawyers made several trips to Califor-
nia and engaged in numerous activities constituting the prac-
115. See Yelton, supra note 108, at 710-11.
116. See id.
117. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court,
949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.) (holding that "legal instrument and contract preparation"
constitutes the practice of law), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
118. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 9.
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tice of law all before an arbitration demand was even filed.119
The case ultimately settled without arbitration.2 ' Although
Birbrower arose in an arbitration context rather than a liti-
gation context, Birbrower illustrates that an out-of-state law-
yer may be unable to validate his or her pre-filing activities
where a case settles prior to litigation.
Even where the lawyer obtains pro hac vice admission
immediately after being retained, the scope of the lawyer's
services may be limited to in-court services.' For instance,
Illinois' pro hac vice rule provides that an out-of-state lawyer
may "be permitted to participate before the court in the trial
or argument of any particular cause in which, for the time
being, he or she is employed."" This limiting language sug-
gests that pro hac vice admission permits only in-court prac-
tice. Similarly, while acknowledging the pro hac vice excep-
tion, the Birbrower court noted that the California pro hac
vice rule provides that "out-of-state counsel may appear be-
fore a court as counsel pro hac vice."2 3 Neither the Illinois
rule nor the California formulation of the pro hac vice excep-
tion confers an out-of-state lawyer with general authority to
perform legal services related to the pending litigation, but
instead limit a lawyer's services to in-court appearances.'24
A narrow pro hac vice rule may not pose significant diffi-
culties where the client is a citizen of the lawyer's home state
and all material witnesses are also located in the lawyer's
home state. In those circumstances, the lawyer may rea-
sonably limit his or her contacts with the foreign state to in-
court appearances. The attorney can perform all other serv-
119. Id. at 3, 7.
120. Id. at 3.
121. See Kalish, supra note 106, at 372-73. "The foreign attorney will be en-
gaged in the unauthorized practice of law for legal work done in the state with-
out, prior to, or which is outside the scope of pro hac vice admission." Id.
122. ILL. S. CT. R. 707 (emphasis added).
123. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 6 (Cal.) (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT, R. 983) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
124. Other states have similarly narrow pro hac vice rules. See, e.g., S.C.
APP. CT. R. 404 (out-of-state lawyer may be permitted "to participate in the
trial or argument of any case"); MICH. ST. BAR. R. 15 (out-of-state lawyer "may
be permitted to engage in the trial of a specific case"); WASH. ADM. PRAC. R. 8
(out-of-state lawyer "may appear as a lawyer in the trial of any action or pro-
ceeding"); COL. R. Civ. P. 221 (out-of-state lawyer may "be permitted to partici-
pate before such Court in the trial or argument of any particular cause").
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ices incident to the representation in his or her home state.
This clear division of services may not be practical where the
client is a citizen of the foreign state where the litigation is
pending. In such circumstances, the lawyer must enter the
foreign jurisdiction to discuss strategy with the client, advise
the client, and perform other services incident to the repre-
sentation. The representation of an institutional client in
complex litigation illustrates these limitations. Representing
an institutional client would likely require discussing strat-
egy with, advising, and perhaps drafting affidavits for a large
number of persons employed by the client. If the state's pro
hac vice rule limits the out-of-state lawyer's activities to court
appearances, the lawyer's services in the foreign jurisdiction
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Nor could
the out-of-state lawyer avoid unauthorized practice by con-
ducting these services in the lawyer's home state. Under
Birbrower, these services will have been performed in the
course of a continuing relationship with an out-of-state client,
or necessitate virtual contacts with the client, and thus con-
stitute practicing law in the foreign state.
While primarily addressing the federal court exception,
Spanos also contains dicta addressing the pro hac vice excep-
tion. Contrary to the narrow interpretation of pro hac vice
admission discussed above, Spanos indicates that pro hac
vice admission would permit an out-of-state lawyer to engage
in "any legal services reasonably incident" to the litigation of
a matter before the court."' This more expansive interpreta-
tion of the pro hac vice rule would presumably authorize out-
of-court services in addition to in-court appearances. 26  A
narrow pro hac vice rule adopted by a particular state would
obviously trump this dicta. Therefore, to avoid an unauthor-
125. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 169 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
126. Some states adopt this more expansive interpretation. See, e.g., FL. ST.
BAR R. 1-3.2 (out-of-state lawyer "who has professional business in a court of
record of this state may ... be permitted to practice for the purpose of such
business"); OK. ST. BAR RULES art. II, § 5 (out-of-state lawyer may be admitted
"for the purpose of conducting an action or a proceeding in which he has been
employed"); PA. BAR ADM. R. 301 (out-of-state lawyer may be admitted "for
purposes limited to a particular matter"). See also Note, supra note 110, at
1200 (pro hac vice admission permits "court appearances and out-of-court func-
tions directly connected with pending litigation") (footnote omitted).
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ized practice claim, practitioners representing out-of-state
clients should consult the foreign state's pro hac vice rule
immediately upon being retained.
Birbrower illustrates how limitations on the process of
obtaining pro hac vice admission render an out-of-state at-
torney vulnerable to an unauthorized practice claim. Even
where the out-of-state lawyer obtains admission pro hac vice,
a narrow pro hac vice rule may limit the scope of a lawyer's
services and thus afford only limited protection from unau-
thorized practice claims.
IV. IN THE WAKE OF BIRBROWER
A. How Does Birbrower Affect the Out-of-State Lawyer?
Birbrower is a California decision and, therefore, only af-
fects non-California lawyers to the extent they practice law
"in California." No other state has interpreted its unauthor-
ized practice rules as broadly.'27 Assuming no exception ap-
plies,'28 may a non-California lawyer ever represent a Cali-
fornia client on a matter involving California law? Although
Birbrower provides little guidance, the court noted that not
all practice by an out-of-state lawyer on a California legal
matter would violate section 6125.129 The Court stated that
"m]ere fortuitous or attenuated contacts will not sustain a
finding that the unlicensed lawyer practiced law 'in Califor-
m,130
nia.
This allowance for fortuitous or attenuated contacts
would presumably permit an out-of-state lawyer to enter
California on behalf of a non-California client to consummate
an isolated transaction incident to the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client in another state. 3 ' In these circumstances,
127. See generally, Mary F. Andreoni, 10 Ethics Questions From Young Law-
yers, CBA RECORD, Feb.-Mar. 1998, at 46, 48 (Administrative Counsel to the
Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission concludes that an
Illinois lawyer who does not physically enter the State of Wisconsin does not
engage in the unauthorized practice of law by rendering legal advice on Wiscon-
sin law to a Wisconsin client).
128. See supra Part III.
129. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949
P.2d 1, 5 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
130. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5 (emphasis added).
131. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 3; see also Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329
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the lawyer's contacts with the State of California are argua-
bly incidental, the matter involves a non-California client and
the lawyer's physical presence in the state is limited to an
isolated occasion.
By contrast, the allowance for "fortuitous or attenuated"
contacts probably would not apply where a non-California
lawyer represents a California client under similar circum-
stances. Even assuming the out-of-state lawyer's physical
presence in California was limited to an isolated occasion
and, therefore, was "fortuitous or attenuated," the lawyer's
contacts with the California client are not "fortuitous or at-
tenuated." The representation of a client necessarily involves
more than incidental contacts between the lawyer and client
whether by telephone, e-mail, facsimile, or other means.
These "virtual contacts" may satisfy the "in California" test.
132
Alternatively, even assuming a lawyer could represent a
California client with only "fortuitous or attenuated" con-
tacts, the lawyer's presence in the state on behalf of the Cali-
fornia client nonetheless occurs in the course of a continuing
relationship with the California client. 3 3 This "continuing
relationship" may also satisfy the "in California" test.
3 4
Thus, the allowance for "fortuitous and attenuated" contacts
would likely not apply where the out-of-state lawyer repre-
sents a California client.
135
Does Birbrower's continuing relationship test"6 effec-
tively preclude an out-of-state lawyer from ever representing
a California client in a matter governed by California law as-
suming no exception applies? Although a definite answer
awaits further clarification from the California courts, Bir-
brower suggests that the California courts would condition
such representation on several requirements.
Given that section 6125 seeks to protect California citi-
(N.Y. 1965) (holding that a California lawyer was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law in New York, thereby precluding recovery of his fees). However,
the court also noted "we cannot penalize every instance in which an attorney
from another State comes into our State for conferences or negotiations relating
to a New York client and a transaction somehow tied to New York." Spivak, 211
N.E.2d at 331.
132. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5-6. See also supra Part II.B-C.
133. See supra note 69.
134. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5. See also supra Part II.B-C.
135. See supra Part II.D.
136. See supra Part II.C-D.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
zens from persons not educated and examined on California
law, 137 the out-of-state lawyer would be required to associate
with local California counsel. Birbrower makes clear, how-
ever, that simply retaining local counsel is not sufficient.'38
Rather, California counsel must be actively and meaningfully
engaged in the representation.'39 This suggests that any is-
sues requiring the interpretation or application of California
law should be delegated to California counsel. Similarly,
California counsel should participate in all strategy sessions
and client conferences where issues involving California law
are discussed. These measures should afford the California
citizen adequate protection from the risks of unauthorized
practice by a non-California lawyer. 4 ° If section 6125 seeks
only to protect California citizens from the risks of unau-
thorized practice,' these measures should permit an out-of-
state lawyer to represent a California client on a matter of
California law.'
V. AVOIDING UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE IN THE
137. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court,
949 P.2d 1, 5, 8 (Cal.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
138. The trial court in Birbrower supported its conclusion that Birbrower
violated section 6125 by noting that Birbrower did not associate with California
counsel. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 4. To correct any misimpression cast by the
trial court, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected any suggestion
that simply retaining local counsel would exempt an out-of-state lawyer from
section 6125. See id. at 4 n.3 ("Contrary to the trial court's implied assump-
tion, no statutory exception to section 6125 allows out-of-state attorneys to
practice law in California as long as they associate local counsel in good stand-
ing with the State Bar.").
139. See id.
140. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 171.(2d Cir.) (en
banc) (conditioning the federal court exception on the association of local coun-
sel because a federal claim may have its basis in state law), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 987 (1966).
141. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5.
142. Birbrower's continuing relationship test is not limited to engagements
dealing with California law. Under Birbrower's "in California" analysis, an out-
of-state lawyer practices law "in California" by maintaining a continuing rela-
tionship with a California client. The Court did not limit this rule to relation-
ships with California clients on matters of California law. Thus, for example,
Birbrower arguably prohibits a Florida lawyer from representing a California
client on a matter of Florida law pending in a Florida court. This extension of
section 6125 would not serve to protect California citizens from the risks of un-
authorized practice. Rather, such a rule would serve only to protect the eco-
nomic interests of California lawyers.
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INTERJURISDICTIONAL CONTEXT.
An out-of-state lawyer can take several steps to guard
against an unauthorized practice claim. At the outset, out-of-
state counsel should send the foreign client an engagement
letter advising the client of those jurisdictions where counsel
is admitted to practice and alerting the client to potential re-
strictions on counsel's services.1 Next, counsel should con-
sult the foreign state's unauthorized practice statute, and
case law interpreting the statute, for guidance in determin-
ing what activities constitute the practice of law in that state.
After being retained, the out-of-state lawyer should re-
tain local counsel in the foreign state. In addition to render-
ing general assistance, local counsel should assume primary
responsibility for any issues requiring the interpretation or
application of the foreign law. As a defensive measure, the
out-of-state lawyer and local counsel should ensure that their
billing entries and written correspondence reflect this divi-
sion of responsibility. Local counsel should participate in the
preparation of all pleadings and other documents of signifi-
cance and cosign these papers, thereby documenting the in-
volvement of local counsel. To the extent a member of the
out-of-state lawyer's firm is admitted in the foreign jurisdic-
tion, that lawyer should be assigned to the matter regardless
of the lawyer's area of expertise.
Where the out-of-state lawyer's services involve litiga-
tion, counsel should seek admission pro hac vice at the earli-
est possible time. Additionally, counsel should carefully re-
view the state's pro hac vice rule to determine the scope of
services authorized by the state's pro hac vice rule. Counsel
should also consult the state's unauthorized practice statute.
Even where a state adopts a narrow pro hac vice rule, the
state's unauthorized practice statute may categorize certain
activities as outside the definition of the practice of law.
Thus, although a state's pro hac vice rule may limit a law-
yer's services to in-court appearances, the out-of-state lawyer
143. Where the client is advised that the lawyer is not licensed to practice in
a given jurisdiction, an argument exists that the client waives any unauthor-
ized practice claim by subsequently engaging the lawyer. Birbrower, Montal-
bano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal.) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 291 (1998).
144. See supra Part III.B.
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may nonetheless perform those out-of-court services that do
not constitute the practice of law. 145
In the event an adverse party is also represented by an
out-of-state lawyer, counsel should inquire whether opposing
counsel has also taken steps to guard against unauthorized
practice. If opposing counsel has failed to take appropriate
measures, counsel may be assisting opposing counsel in the
unauthorized practice of law.'46 Birbrower illustrates this
point. If Tandem's lawyers knew that counsel for ESQ (the
Birbrower lawyers) were not licensed in California, but Tan-
dem's lawyers nonetheless continued to deal with the Bir-
brower lawyers in California, Tandem's lawyers arguably
aided Birbrower in the unauthorized practice of law in viola-
tion of Model Rule 5.5(b). 147 Additionally, Tandem's lawyers
could also be sanctioned for assisting another in the violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct 48 or for failing to report
a known violation of the Rules.'49
VI. CONCLUSION
The Birbrower holding announces no new rule. The Bir-
brower lawyers were not licensed to practice law in Califor-
nia. They nonetheless discussed legal strategy, rendered le-
gal advice, filed an arbitration demand, and ultimately
negotiated a settlement of a dispute governed by California
law for a California client while physically present in Cali-
fornia. No exception applied. These lawyers plainly engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law in California.
145. See Condon v. McHenry, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 925 n.4. (1998) (noting
that out-of-state lawyers can recover fees for services performed "in California"
if those services do not constitute the practice of law).
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5(b) ("A lawyer
shall not.., assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance
of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.").
147. See id.; see also 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING § 5.5:203 (2d ed. & Supp. 1996).
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a) ("It is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to ... violate or attempt to violate the Rules of
Professional Conduct, [or] knowingly assist or induce another to do so .... ).
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) ("A lawyer
having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
appropriate professional authority.").
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Birbrower's significance lies in the court's unprecedented
suggestion that a lawyer who never physically enters a for-
eign state may nonetheless violate that state's unauthorized
practice rules through "virtual contacts" with the client or by
maintaining a "continuing relationship" with the client. Bir-
brower also illustrates that the traditional exceptions to un-
authorized practice afford only limited protection from unau-
thorized practice claims.
Perhaps Birbrower is simply further testament to Cali-
fornia's reluctance to accommodate out-of-state lawyers.50
On the other hand, Birbrower may signal a trend toward
tighter enforcement of unauthorized practice rules in the in-
terjurisdictional context. At the very least, Birbrower in-
creases awareness of the risks and consequences of unau-
thorized practice by out-of-state lawyers.
150. See Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: In-
terjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice By Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 665, 681 (1995) (noting that certain states, "led by California," have en-
acted "obstructive regulation" making it difficult for out-of-state lawyers to
practice in the foreign state); ALAS Loss Prevention Journal, supra note 10, at
26 ("Some states, like California, have developed a reputation for being less
permissive than other states about sporadic work by out-of-state lawyers.").

